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Abstract
We extend the Lucas’ 1988 model introducing two classes of agents
with heterogeneous skills, discount factors and initial human capital
endowments. We consider two regimes according to the planner’s po-
litical constraints. In the meritocratic regime, the planner faces indi-
vidual constraints. In the redistributive regime, the planner faces an
aggregate constraint. We ﬁnd that heterogeneity matters, particularly
with redistribution. In the meritocratic regime, the optimal solution
coincides with the BGP found by Lucas (1988) for the representative
agent’s case. In contrast, in the redistribution case, the solution for
time devoted to capital accumulation is never interior for both agents.
Either the less talented agents do not accumulate human capital or
the more skilled agents do not work. Moreover, social welfare under
the redistribution regime is always higher than under meritocracy and
it is optimal to exploit existing diﬀerences. Finally, we ﬁnd that in-
equality in human capital distribution increases in time and that, in
the long run, inequality always promotes growth.
Keywords: human capital, heterogenous patience and skills, in-
equality and growth. JEL codes: J24, O15, O40.
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1 Introduction
Though the consideration of human capital as a source of economic growth
and development goes back at least to Adam Smith (1776),1 for a long time
the concept of human capital was dormant. Interest in the economic role
of human capital was awakened in the late 1950s and early 1960s through
the writings of Mincer (1958, 1962), Schultz (1961, 1962) and Becker (1962,
1964), who rekindled this concept by emphasizing its importance in explain-
ing earnings diﬀerentials and its links with economic growth.
Human capital as an engine of growth was incorporated into growth the-
ory by Uzawa (1965). The emergence of a new endogenous growth literature
stimulated the interest of economists in the role of human capital. In his
(1988) paper, Lucas shows that the growth rate of per capita income de-
pends on the growth rate of human capital, which in turn depends on the
time individuals use for acquiring skills. In a more recent work Manuelli and
Seshadri (2014) “suggest that human capital has a central role in determining
the wealth of nations and that the quality of human capital varies systemati-
cally with the level of development”.2 Lucas (2015) proposes a simple model
where "all growth is driven by schooling and on-the-job learning”.
Most of endogenous growth models with human capital accumulation as-
sume a representative agent, which is only a fair approximation if income and
wealth inequality play a negligible role in the process of economic develop-
ment.3 However, it is widely recognized that inequality has a strong impact
on economic growth, although it is not clear if this impact is positive or
negative. The accumulation of savings (Stiglitz, 1969; Bourguignon, 1981),
unobservable eﬀort (Rebelo, 1991) and the investment project size (Barro,
2000) represent the main channels through which inequality may enhance
growth. On the other hand, in the presence of credit market imperfections,
inequality has a negative impact on investment (Bénabou, 1996 and 2000)
and entrepreneurial activity (Banerjee and Newman, 1993), and hence on
1Adam Smith included in the capital stock of a nation the inhabitants’ acquired and
useful talents, and noticed that human skills increase wealth for society.
2Illustrative accounting estimates by Jones (2014) “suggest that human capital varia-
tion can be substantially ampliﬁed, including to the point where capital variation could
possibly fully account for cross-country income diﬀerences”.
3Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) also study the evolution of a (lognormal) distribution
of human capital over time in an endogenous growth model, but, unlike us, they consider
overlapping generations.
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economic growth. Empirical studies are also generally inconclusive. While
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Perotti (1996)
show a negative relationship between inequality and growth, more recent
works by Partridge (1997), Forbes (2000) and Frank (2009) ﬁnd a positive
relationship.4
Economists have also paid attention to the relationship between the accu-
mulation of human capital and inequality. Becker and Tomes (1979), Viaene
and Zilcha (2003) and Galor and Moav (2004) emphasize educational attain-
ment as one of the causes of greater income inequality. The latter authors
ﬁnd that when human capital replaces physical capital as the driving force
of economic growth, a greater equality improves the growth performance.
Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993) identify credit
market constraints as the channel relating the accumulation of human cap-
ital and inequality. Galor and Ozak (2016) establishes signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect of the geographical origins of time preference on human capital. Bén-
abou (2002) compares educational and ﬁscal redistributions and ﬁnds that
the former is better for growth. Eicher and García-Peñalosa (2001) predict
a non-monotonic relationship between educational attainment and inequal-
ity, which drives the lack of a clear relation between inequality and growth.
More recently, Turnovsky (2011) and Turnovsky and Mitra (2013) propose
two-sector endogenous growth models linking human capital accumulation
and income inequality. They ﬁnd that an increase in the growth rate re-
sulting from productivity enhancement in the human capital sector will be
accompanied by an increase in inequality, whereas a productivity boost in
the ﬁnal output sector results in a reduction in inequality.
In this paper we introduce a model of human capital accumulation and
economic growth with heterogeneous agents. Not only we assume that agents
are heterogeneous in terms of (1) human capital endowments, but also in term
of (2) patience and (3) cognitive skills. Moreover, we assume that agents with
higher cognitive skills are more patient.
There is an empirical literature about the heterogeneity in patience and
cognitive skills, and the relationship between patience and skills.
In almost all growth models with inﬁnitely-lived agents, patience plays
a key role. In exogenous growth models with physical capital, higher pa-
tience implies a higher propensity to save and hence a higher steady state
4Barro (2000) ﬁnds that the eﬀect of income inequality on economic growth can diﬀer
between poor and rich economies.
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stock of physical capital. In the context of endogenous growth models with
human capital accumulation, higher patience implies greater incentives to
devote time to the acquisition of skills and hence leads to higher rates of
growth. Recent results of Hübner and Vannoorenberghe (2015) suggest that
increasing patience by one standard deviation raises per-capita income by
between 34% and 78%. Dohmen et al. (2015) show that average patience
explains a considerable fraction of the variation in growth rates both in the
medium run and in the long run and about 40% of the between-country
variation in income. Their results establish that, within countries, average
patience in geographical regions predicts average years of education and, in
individual-level analyses, that individual patience predicts educational at-
tainment within countries and regions. Patience varies not only between
countries, but also within countries. Falk et al. (2015), using the ﬁrst global
survey on measuring preferences, which includes 80000 individuals from 76
countries, that represent 90 percent of world population and income, ﬁnd
that between-country variance accounts for about 13.5 percent of total varia-
tion in patience. These authors also ﬁnd a positive relation between patience
and cognitive skills which "is statistically signiﬁcant in almost all countries.
This reveals that the relationship is relatively universal, and arguably not
the product of institutions or speciﬁc educational and value systems".
There is a literature on models with inﬁnitely-lived agents heterogeneous
in their discount factor (see a very good survey by Becker (2006)). At the
same time, to the best of our knowledge, all models with human capital
accumulation assume either a representative agent or agents with an identical
discount factor. In fact, the only type of heterogeneity considered in these
models was heterogeneity in initial human capital.5
Suen (2014) also addresses the issue of the relationship between hetero-
geneity in time preference and economic inequality in a market economy with
human and physical capital accumulation. Preference for wealth prevents
the economy from collapsing into a degenerate distribution of capital, while
human capital formation generates a positive correlation between earnings
and capital income. Diﬀerently from Suen (2014), we consider the planner’s
solution and we leave aside the physical capital accumulation.
A recent empirical literature emphasizes the increasing role of cognitive
skills in promoting economic well-being and wage determination (see Burks
et al. (2009) and Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) among others).
5See Turnovsky (2011) and Turnovsky and Mitra (2013) cited above.
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Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) introduce direct measures of cognitive
skills from international tests of mathematics and science and show that
the achievement of the population is closely related to cognitive skills and,
importantly, that a causal interpretation is likely warranted. In particular,
they regress growth on initial levels of GDP and international test scores
over the period 1960-2000 for the set of 50 countries and obtain a very good
results: their simple model can explain three-quarters of the variance in
growth rates.
Cognitive skills play an important role in individual economic per-
formance and wage determination. A large literature has documented a sig-
niﬁcant increase in wage inequality, measured as the diﬀerence between the
wage of skilled and unskilled workers, over the past decades. The existing lit-
erature has proposed the following explanations of the rise in skill premium:
an increase in the relative demand for skills caused by skill biased technical
change; product demand shifts across sectors with diﬀerent skill intensities;
a slowdown in the growth of the relative supply of skilled workers (compre-
hensive discussions of this literature are found in Lemieux (2010) and Autor
et al. (2008)).
Lemieux (2006) notes that "explanations for the growth in wage in-
equality linked to standard human capital variables like experience and ed-
ucation are limited by the fact that these variables explain only about a
third of the variance of wages" (p. 461). It is seems reasonable to explain
the residual wage inequality by heterogeneity on cognitive skills particularly
against the backdrop of increasing role of human capital in economic growth.
It should be noted that often the terms education and skill are used in-
terchangeably. What evidence do we have that cognitive skills (numeracy
and problem-solving) are rewarded more than educational credentials? Au-
tor (2014) considers representative samples of adults in 22 OECD countries
and ﬁnds that "cognitive skills are substantially rewarded in the labor mar-
ket across all twenty-two economies. The average wage premium to a one
"unit" (i.e., one standard deviation) increase in measured cognitive skills is
18 percent. In addition, cognitive earnings premia diﬀer substantially across
countries. The premium is below 13 percent in the Sweden, the Czech Re-
public, and Norway. It is above 20 percent in six countries. Third, the U.S.
stands out as having the highest measured return to skill, with a premium
of 28 percent per unit increment to cognitive ability. Concretely, comparing
two U.S. workers who are one standard deviation above and one standard
deviation below the population average of cognitive ability, respectively, we
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would expect their full-time weekly earnings to diﬀer by 50 to 60 percent."
It also should be noted that though the wage inequality literature
has typically focused on wage diﬀerentials between education groups, wages
also vary within education categories. It was noted that much of the overall
increase in wage inequality has been due to an increase in inequality within
education groups (see e.g. Katz (1999), Gosling et al. (2000) and Lemieux
(2006)). Lindley and McIntosh (2015) investigate why such wage inequal-
ity has grown. They show that in U.K. most of the increase in graduate
wage inequality has occurred within degree subjects, rather than between.
Also they investigate the increase in the variance of childhood cognitive test
scores amongst graduates in the same subject and the widening variety of
jobs performed by graduates with degrees in the same subject as potential
explanations of the increase in wage inequality. Lindley and McIntosh (2015,
p. 101) ﬁnd that "both of these factors have played a role in explaining
growing graduate wage inequality within subjects, though the largest is by
far from the increased variance of test scores."
We know less about the relationships between cognitive skills and pa-
tience, though the notion that more intelligent people are more patient (they
discount future rewards less) was advanced by Rae (1834) and supported by
recent studied.
The relationship between cognitive ability and patience has been
tested in several (rather unsystematic) psychological studies surveyed in Fred-
erick (2005). Considering short-term choices between monetary rewards,
Frederick (2005) ﬁnds that those who scored higher on the Cognitive Re-
ﬂection Test were generally more patient, but for longer horizons, temporal
preferences seem weakly related or unrelated to the Cognitive Reﬂection Test
scores. A study by Burks et al. (2009) shows that individuals with better
cognitive skills are more patient, in both short and long run. Falk et al.
(2015), using a new data set that covers 80000 individuals from 76 coun-
tries, ﬁnd that patience is more pronounced among individuals with higher
cognitive ability.
Our model focuses more on the basic mechanism of saving/investment in
human capital in a model with central planner and heterogenous agents that
diﬀer in their discount factors, their skills in accumulating capital and initial
human capital endowments. There is no room for (credit) market imperfec-
tion as in Galor and Zeira (1993) and Bénabou (1996 and 2000) and, thus,
conclusions are quite diﬀerent: inequalities have a positive impact on growth
as was the case in the seminal papers by Stiglitz (1969) and Bourguignon
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(1981). More precisely, in order to better understand the trade-oﬀ between
inequalities and growth, we extend the Lucas’ 1988 model introducing two
classes of agents with heterogenous skills, patience and initial human wealth,6
and we consider two regimes according to the planner’s political constraints.
In the ﬁrst regime, that we call meritocracy, the planner faces individual
constraints. In the second regime the planner redistributes the total product
and, then, formally, faces an aggregate constraint. We ﬁnd that heterogeneity
matters, specially with redistribution. Indeed, although in the meritocratic
regime the solution coincides with the representative agent’s Lucas BGP, in
the redistribution case the optimal solution for non-leisure time devoted to
capital accumulation is never interior for both agents. Either the less tal-
ented agents do not accumulate human capital or the more skilled agents do
not work. Obviously, the social welfare under the redistribution regime is
always higher than under meritocracy because the planner’s program is less
constrained. Third, the redistribution of consumption is not aﬀected by the
distribution of skills, depending only on diﬀerences in patience. In contrast,
the allocation of tasks takes into account skills diﬀerences. Finally we ﬁnd
that inequality in the distribution of human capital increases in time, and
that inequality is associated with higher rates of growth in both regimes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
present the fundamentals of the models considered. The meritocratic and
the redistributive cases are analyzed in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. In
Section 5 we compare both cases and further discuss our results. Finally, in
Section 6, we provide some concluding remarks. Proofs and computations
are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Fundamentals
The models considered follow closely the Lucas (1988) framework, extending
it to account for agents heterogeneity. Since we want to focus on the role of
heterogeneity in human capital accumulation on inequality and growth, we
ignore technological change and physical capital accumulation.
We consider two classes of agents: patient and impatient households,
labeled respectively by 0 and 1. They have diﬀerent discount rates, ρi, i = 0, 1
6Note that diﬀerently from the Ramsey model with physical capital accumulation
(Becker, 1980), our extensions exhibit long-run distributions of capital (heterogenous hu-
man capital) that are non-degenerated.
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with ρ0 < ρ1.
We denote the individual labor supply by lit and the size of each class by
πi. We normalize the size of the entire population to one so that π0+π1 = 1.
Then, lt, aggregate labor supply is given by
lt =
1
i=0
πilit (1)
We consider a linear constant returns technology.
Assumption 1 Technology is represented by a production function
yt = Alt (2)
where yt denotes aggregate production and A > 0 is a scaling parameter.
Leisure time is exogenous. Non-leisure time is normalized to one and
spent either working or accumulating human capital (education and health).
Individual labor supply is given by the product of human capital, hit, and
working time, uit, i.e.,
lit ≡ hituit (3)
This means that both factors are necessary in order to supply labor. The
remaining non-leisure time, 1−uit, is devoted to human capital accumulation.
The speciﬁcation chosen for human capital accumulation of each class of
agents is identical to the one considered in Lucas (1988). However we assume
that the two classes have diﬀerent skills in accumulating human capital.7
Assumption 2 The law of human capital accumulation is given by
h˙it/hit = Bi (1− uit) (4)
If an individual does not devote any non-leisure time to human capital
accumulation then there is no accumulation. If an individual devotes all his
non-leisure time to human capital accumulation then his human capital grows
at its maximal rate, Bi, which is speciﬁc to each class, denoting diﬀerent
skills. As in Lucas (1988) we assume that Bi > ρi.
We denote by cit real consumption of an individual of class i, and by ct
aggregate consumption in the economy. Production is entirely consumed so
that ct ≡
1
i=0 πicit = yt.
7We do not consider the human capital externalities resulting from learning spillovers,
that can account for a positive eﬀect of equality on growth.
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For simplicity we assume no labor or capital accumulation disutility.
Assumption 3 Preferences are rationalized by a logarithmic felicity ∞
0
e−ρit ln citdt (5)
with ρ0 < ρ1.
As in Lucas (1988) we consider a planner who maximizes the weighted
sum of utilities
1
i=0
πi
 ∞
0
e−ρit ln citdt =
 ∞
0
1
i=0
πie
−ρit ln citdt (6)
an intertemporal welfare functional, under (4).8
In the following, we consider two regimes according to the planner’s polit-
ical constraints. In the ﬁrst regime, that we call "meritocracy", the planner’s
faces individual constraints:
cit ≤ Alit (7)
Remark that when instead of two classes of individuals the subscript i
denotes two countries, the meritocratic regime corresponds to the autarky
situation.
In the second regime, that we call "redistribution", the planner faces an
aggregate constraint:
1
i=0
πicit ≤ Alt (8)
When i denotes countries instead of classes of individuals, this regime
corresponds to the case where the two countries are integrated in one union.
3 Meritocracy
In this case the planner maximizes (6) subject to (4) and (7). The Hamil-
tonian is written as follows:
1
i=0
πie
−ρit ln (Ahituit) +
1
i=0
λithitBi (1− uit)
8The question of time-consistency can be raised in the case of a welfare function max-
imization with heterogenous agents. As noted by Zuber (2011) and Heal and Millner
(2015), stationarity and time-consistency of aggregate preferences hold together only if
agents have the same discount factor.
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We have two state variables (hit) and two controls (uit). The strict con-
cavity of the objective function and the concavity of the law of motion with
respect to (hit, uit) satisfy the Arrow-Mangasarian suﬃcient condition for
Hamiltonian maximization and imply the uniqueness of the planner’s solu-
tion.
Proposition 1. The optimal solution is the Balanced Growth Path (BGP):
u∗it =
ρi
Bi
and h∗it = hi0e
(Bi−ρi)t (9)
for t ≥ 0. This solution is unique.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This solution coincides with that forwarded by Lucas (1988) in the repre-
sentative agent’s case. In fact, what the planner is doing in the meritocratic
case is simply solving two independent problems, each of them featuring iden-
tical agents. Note that with the functional forms chosen we are able to prove
analytically Lucas (1988) conjecture that the BGP is the optimal solution.
We can see that the equilibrium growth rate of human capital of class i
increases with the class ability in investing in human capital, Bi, and declines
with increases in the class discount rate, ρi. However, what really matters for
human capital growth is the diﬀerence between these two parameters. This
means that more skilled but very impatient agents may accumulate human
capital at a lower rate than less skilled but more patient ones. However, we
will rule out this possibility since it is not supported by empirical studies.
Indeed, Falk et al. (2015), using a new data set that covers 80000 individuals
from 76 countries, ﬁnd that patience is more pronounced among individuals
with higher cognitive ability. Importantly, this relationship holds when con-
trolling for income, education, and country ﬁxed eﬀects. Earlier studies for
the US, Germany, and Chile, have also found that higher cognitive ability is
associated with greater patience.9 Therefore, we assume that the growth rate
of human capital accumulation of the patient consumer, B0 − ρ0, always ex-
ceeds the growth case of the impatient one, B1−ρ1, i.e. we consider that the
patient consumer, i = 0, is the dominant one. Let δ ≡ (B0− ρ0)− (B1 − ρ1)
denote the diﬀerence between the growth rates of patient and impatient con-
sumers.10
Assumption 4 δ > 0.
9See Frederick (2005), Dohmen et al. (2010) and Benjamin et al. (2013), respectively.
10The stock of human capital/wealth of those households who discount future outcomes
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3.1 Inequality and growth in the meritocratic case
Let us now discuss the trade-oﬀ between social inequalities and growth in the
meritocratic case. The ﬁrst choice that we have to make is how to measure
these two concepts. Most studies use income inequality data as a proxy
for social inequality and the growth rate of income to measure economic
growth. In this work we chose to measure social inequalities using the Gini
index of consumption, while economic growth is measured by the growth
rate of aggregate consumption. In the meritocratic case, as consumption
and income (output) coincide, both at the individual and aggregate level, this
choice is irrelevant. In contrast, in the redistribution case, although aggregate
consumption is still identical to aggregate output, the real welfare of each
individual is given by consumption and not by output. Therefore, social
inequalities are better proxied using a measure of consumption inequality.
Also, since in this work we focus on the eﬀects of human capital on inequality
and growth we start by presenting the Gini index of human wealth, which
measures inequality in the distribution of human capital.
Proposition 2. If, without loss of generality, h0t > h1t, the period t Gini
index of human wealth is given by
ght = π1 −
π1h1t
π0h0t + π1h1t
(10)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The stock of human capital that a class has accumulated until period t,
hit, depends not only on the class rate of growth of human capital accumula-
tion, Bi− ρi, but also on its initial human capital endowment, hi0. However,
it is easy to see that, in the long run, the growth rate eﬀect will dominate.
We have therefore the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (human wealth inequality). Let Assumption 4 hold.
1. If h00 > h10, then h0t > h1t for every t and
ght = π1 −
π1h10e
−δt
π0h00 + π1h10e−δt
(11)
more heavily, will either lack permanently behind or be eventually exceeded by the human
capital/wealth of more patient households. A similar story of overtaking is presented by
Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) with regard to the Industrial Revolution. They attributes the
overtaking of the wealthy aristocracy by middle-class industrialists, as the dominant (in
economic terms) group, to heterogeneous degrees of patience that are actually endogenous
and diﬀused endogenously through a process of intergenerational cultural transmission.
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Thus, gt increases monotonically from gh0 = π1−π1h10/ (π0h00 + π1h10)
to g∞ = π1.
2. If h00 < h10, then there is a critical date
Th =
ln (h10/h00)
δ
(12)
beyond which the human capital stock of the dominant (patient) class
exceeds the human capital stock of the impatient class. In this case, the
Gini index of human wealth is given by
ght = π0 −
π0h00
π0h00 + π1h10e−δt
for t ≤ Th (13)
ght = π1 −
π1h10e
−δt
π0h00 + π1h10e−δt
for t > Th (14)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Since human capital and consumption of an individual of type i grow at
the same rate along the BGP, the observed diﬀerences in the evolution of
the Gini index of human wealth and the Gini index of consumption reﬂect
mainly diﬀerences in initial endowments, being therefore relevant only in the
short run.
Deﬁnition 4. If, without loss of generality, c0t > c1t, the Gini index of
consumption is given by
gct = π1 −
π1c1t
π0c0t + π1c1t
(15)
Proposition 5 (consumption inequality). Let Assumption 4 hold.
1. If c00 > c10, then c0t > c1t for every t and
gct = π1 −
π1c10e
−δt
π0c00 + π1c10e−δt
(16)
Thus, gt increases monotonically from g0 = π1 − π1c10/ (π0c00 + π1c10)
to g∞ = π1.
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2. If c00 < c10, then there is a critical date
Tc =
ln (c10/c00)
δ
(17)
beyond which consumption of the dominant (patient) class exceeds con-
sumption of the impatient class. In this case, the Gini index of con-
sumption is given by
gct = π0 −
π0c00
π0c00 + π1c10e−δt
for t ≤ Tc (18)
gct = π1 −
π1c10e
−δt
π0c00 + π1c10e−δt
for t > Tc (19)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Remark that h00 > h10 does not imply c00 > c10. Indeed, using (3), (7)
and (9), we can rewrite this last inequality as
h00 > h10
ρ1
ρ0
B0
B1
where ρ1/ρ0 > 1, so that we have c10 > c00 if B1 is suﬃciently low.
We now describe the evolution of the growth rate of aggregate consump-
tion.
Proposition 6 (consumption growth rate). The dynamics of the aggre-
gate consumption growth rate are given by
γct ≡
c˙t
ct
=
π0c00 (B0 − ρ0) e
δt + π1c10 (B1 − ρ1)
π0c00eδt + π1c10
(20)
Proof. See the Appendix.
We can now characterize the trade-oﬀ between inequality and growth in
the meritocratic case.
Proposition 7 (trade-oﬀ inequality-growth). Let Assumption 4 hold.
In case (1) of Proposition 5 (c00 > c10), the higher the consumption in-
equality, the higher the growth rate:
γc = π0 (B0 − ρ0) + π1 (B1 − ρ1) + δgc (21)
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In case (2) of Proposition 5 (c00 < c10), this trade-oﬀ holds after Tc and
is reversed before:
γc = π0 (B0 − ρ0) + π1 (B1 − ρ1)− δgc for t ≤ Tc
(22)
γc = π0 (B0 − ρ0) + π1 (B1 − ρ1) + δgc for t > Tc
(23)
Proof. See the Appendix.
We conclude that, in the long run, higher inequality is always associated
with higher growth in the meritocratic case. However, in the short run,
depending on the initial distribution of skills and endowments, this result
may be reversed. Indeed, in the subcase t ≤ Tc of case (2) where c00 < c10,
the lower the social inequality, the higher the growth rate.
4 Redistribution
In this case the planner maximizes the same social welfare functional:
1
i=0
πi
 ∞
0
e−ρit ln citdt =
 ∞
0
1
i=0
πie
−ρit ln citdt
under the resource constraint
1
i=0
πicit ≤ A
1
i=0
πihituit (24)
and the law of motion of human capital
h˙it = Bi (1− uit) hit
with 0 ≤ uit ≤ 1.
There are two state variables (hit) and four controls (cit and uit). In
this case, since there is redistribution, the planner can solve its problem in
two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, given hit and uit, the planner solves a static
problem:
max
c0t,c1t
1
i=0
πie
−ρit ln cit
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subject to (24). The solution of this static program is given by:
cit = Ae
−ρit
1
j=0 πjhjtujt1
j=0 πje
−ρjt
(25)
Note that the division of consumption among individuals is only deter-
mined by the degree of impatience, ρi, not being inﬂuenced by the distribu-
tion of skills, Bi. Since ct = yt, using (24) and (25) we obtain the consumption
share
sit ≡
πicit
ct
=
πie
−ρit1
j=0 πje
−ρjt
Substituting now (25) in the original problem it becomes
max
 ∞
0

1
i=0
πie
−ρit ln
Ae−ρit1
j=0 πje
−ρjt
+

1
i=0
πie
−ρit

ln
1
j=0
πjhjtujt

dt
or, equivalently,
max
 ∞
0

1
i=0
πie
−ρit

ln
1
j=0
πjhjtujtdt
subject to h˙it = Bi (1− uit)hit with 0 ≤ uit ≤ 1.
We now have to obtain the optimal solution for hit and uit. To better
understand the mechanisms involved we will start by analyzing the case
where B0 = B1, the only diﬀerence between the two types of agents being
their degree of patience.
4.1 Redistribution without heterogeneity in skills
In this case B0 = B1 = B, and 0 < ρ0 < ρ1.
Proposition 8. If B0 = B1 = B, and 0 < ρ0 < ρ1 the optimal trajectory
(hit, uit)i=0,1 is given by:
hit = φζi
1
j=0
πj
ρj
e(B−ρj)t and uit =
1
B
1
j=0 πje
(B−ρj)t1
j=0
πj
ρj
e(B−ρj)t
∈ (0, 1) (26)
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for t ≥ 0, where
φ =
1
i=0 πihi01
i=0
πi
ρi
and ζi =
hi01
j=0 πjhj0
(27)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Observe that in this case (B0 = B1 = B), we have u0t = u1t = ut, which
converges to ρ0/B. The total human capital stock Ht =
1
i=0 πihit, satisﬁes
H˙t = BHt (1− ut).
4.2 Redistribution with heterogeneity in skills
In this subsection we obtain the optimal trajectory (hit, uit)i=0,1 for B0 = B1,
and 0 < ρ0 < ρ1.
Our ﬁrst important result is given in the proposition below.
Proposition 9. Let B0 = B1. For every t, there exists an i such that
uit ∈ {0, 1}.
Proposition 9 tells us that, in contrast to the meritocratic case and to the
redistribution case without heterogeneity in skills, we never have an interior
solution for working time, uit, of both classes of agents.
Using this proposition, we can ﬁnd the explicit planner’s solution, which
is the optimal trajectory. To this purpose we introduce the following assump-
tion.
Assumption 5 B0 > B1 > ρ1 > ρ0.
According to Assumption 5, and in line with empirical evidence,11 the
dominant class is not only more patient (ρ0 < ρ1), but is also more talented
in accumulating human capital (B0 > B1). Indeed, as discussed above, Falk
et al. (2015) ﬁnd that the relationship between cognitive ability and patience
is unequivocally positive in almost all countries. Assumption 5 is of course
more restrictive than Assumption 4. Indeed, Assumption 5 implies δ > 0,
while the reverse is not true.
Let us deﬁne the average discount rate, ρ (t), as a time-dependent har-
monic mean of discount rates
ρ (t) ≡

1
i=0
1
ρi
πie
−ρit1
j=0 πje
−ρjt
−1
∈ (ρ0, ρ1) (28)
11See again Falk et al. (2015), Dohmen et al. (2010), Benjamin et al. (2013) and
Frederick (2005).
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Of course, under Assumption 5, B0 > B1 > ρ (t). Moreover, ρ (t) decreases
from ρ (0) ∈ (ρ0, ρ1) to ρ (∞) = ρ0. If t = 0, (28) simpliﬁes to:
ρ (0) =

1
i=0
πi
ρi
−1
which is a harmonic mean where the weights are the size of each class, πi.
In the following,
Hit ≡ πihit and σit ≡
Hit
H0t +H1t
(29)
will denote respectively the human capital of class i at time t and its aggregate
share. Of course,
1
i=0 σit = 1.
To simplify the presentation we will consider separately the following two
cases:
1. σ10 ≤ σ
∗
10 ≡ ρ (0) /B0,
2. σ10 > σ
∗
10.
Note that in the ﬁrst case, since σ10 is suﬃciently small, the more patient
and talented class is also relatively well endowed in initial human capital.
4.2.1 The case where σ10 ≤ σ
∗
10
The optimal trajectory in this case is given in Proposition 10 below.
Proposition 10. Let Assumption 5 hold and assume that σ10 ≤ σ
∗
10 ≡
ρ (0) /B0. Then, the optimal trajectory (hit, uit)i=0,1 is given by
h0t =
H10
σ10
ρ (0)
π0
1
i=0
πi

e(B0−ρi)t
ρi
−
σ10
ρi
	
(30)
u0t =
1
i=0 πi


e(B0−ρi)t
B0
− σ10
ρi

1
i=0 πi


e(B0−ρi)t
ρi
− σ10
ρi
 ∈ (0, 1) (31)
and
h1t = h10 (32)
u1t = 1 (33)
for every t ≥ 0.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
We notice that 0 < u0t < 1 and u1t = 1 for every t ≥ 0. This means that
when the initial human capital endowment of the patient and talented class
is relatively important, the less patient and less talented class never invests
in human capital, devoting all its non-leisure time to work. This result can
be seen as an application of the comparative advantage principle, according
to which agents will specialize in the activity where they are relatively better.
However, the more patient and talented agent also devotes some non-leisure
to work every period. Remember that in order to supply labor, contributing
therefore to production, an agent must devote some time to work. See (3). In
this case, as the initial capital endowment of the skilled class is suﬃciently
important, these agents divide each period their non-leisure time between
work and capital accumulation, contributing to the production eﬀort since the
beginning. Also, since, under Assumption 5, B0 > ρ1, we get limt→∞ u0t =
ρ0/B0 < 1.
It is easy to conclude that since only the more talented and patient class
accumulates human capital, its human capital share, σ0t, strictly increases in
time. Replacing (30) and (32) in (29) we obtain the dynamics of the human
capital shares.
Lemma 11 (shares of human capital). Under Assumption 5 and σ10 ≤
σ∗10 ≡ ρ (0) /B0, the shares of human capital at time t are given by
σ0t = 1− σ1t
σ1t =
σ101
i=0wie
(B0−ρi)t
(34)
for any t, where the denominator is an average with weights
wi ≡
πi
ρi
/
1
j=0
πj
ρj
4.2.2 The case where σ10 > σ
∗
10
We start by introducing four important critical values: T0, T1, T2, with
T1 < T2, and λ10. We deﬁne T0 and T2 (λ10) respectively as the solutions of
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the two following equalities below
σ1T0 = σ
∗
1T0
≡
ρ (T0)
B0
σ1T2 = σ
∗
1T2
≡
ρ (T2)
B0
that we can rewrite respectively as:
B0
ρ (T0)
= 1 +
H00
H10
eB0T0 (35)
B0
ρ (T2)
= 1 +
H00
H10
eB0T2
eB1T1

1 +
1
i=0
πi
ρi

1− e−ρiT1
1
i=0
πi
B1
e−ρiT1

(36)
where T1 (λ10) is the smallest solution of
λ10h10 =
1
i=0
πi
B1
e−ρiT1 +
1
i=0
πi
ρi

1− e−ρiT1

(37)
Note that at T1 we have u1t = 1. Notice also that T2 equals T0 when T1 = 0.
Finally, let λ10 be the solution of
f (λ10) ≡
1
ρ(T2(λ10))
− 1
B0
1
ρ(T1(λ10))
− 1
B1
−
1
i=0 πie
−ρiT1(λ10)1
i=0 πie
−ρiT2(λ10)
= 0 (38)
λ10 determines in turn T1 (λ10) and T2 (λ10).
The optimal trajectory in this case, where σ10 > σ
∗
10, i.e., the initial
human capital share of the less patient and less talented class exceeds the
critical threshold σ∗10 ≡ ρ (0) /B0, is given in Proposition 12 below.
Proposition 12. Let Assumption 5 hold and assume that σ10 > σ
∗
10 ≡
ρ (0) /B0.
1. If
B1 ≤ B
∗
1 ≡
1
1
ρ(0)
−


1
ρ(T0)
− 1
B0
1
i=0 πie
−ρiT0
(39)
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then the optimal trajectory (hit, uit)i=0,1 is given by
h0t = h00e
B0t for 0 ≤ t ≤ T0 (40)
h0t =
H10
π0
 1
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B0−ρi)t1
i=0
πi
B0
e(B0−ρi)T0
− 1

for t > T0 (41)
u0t = 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T0 (42)
u0t =
1
i=0
πi
B0
e(B0−ρi)t −
1
i=0
πi
B0
e(B0−ρi)T01
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B0−ρi)t −
1
i=0
πi
B0
e(B0−ρi)T0
∈ (0, 1) for t > T0
(43)
and
h1t = h10 for any t (44)
u1t = 1 for any t (45)
2. If
B1 > B
∗
1 ≡
1
1
ρ(0)
−


1
ρ(T0)
− 1
B0
1
i=0 πie
−ρiT0
then the optimal trajectory (hit, uit)i=0,1 is given by
h0t = h00e
B0t for 0 ≤ t ≤ T2 (46)
h0t =
H1T2
π0
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B0−ρi)t
λ1T2h1T2e
B0T2
− 1

for t ≥ T2 (47)
u0t = 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T2
u0t =
1
i=0
πi
B0
e(B0−ρi)t − λ1T2h1T2e
B0T21
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B0−ρi)t − λ1T2h1T2e
B0T2
∈ (0, 1) for t ≥ T2 (48)
and
h1t = h10e
B1t

1−
1
λ10h10
1
i=0
πi
ρi

1− e−ρit

for 0 ≤ t ≤ T1 (49)
h1t = h1T1 for t ≥ T1
u1t =
1
B1
1
i=0 πie
−ρit
λ10h10 +
1
i=0
πi
ρi
(e−ρit − 1)
∈ (0, 1) for 0 ≤ t < T1(50)
u1t = 1 for t ≥ T1
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where λ10h10 is given by (37),
λ1T2h1T2 =
1
i=0
πi
B1
e−ρiT1 +
1
i=0
πi
ρi

e−ρiT2 − e−ρiT1

(51)
and H1T2 = π1h1T1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In case 1 of Proposition 12, although the initial capital share of the
less talented and less patient individuals is now above the critical thresh-
old ρ (0) /B0, as they are not suﬃciently skilled, B1 ≤ B
∗
1 , these individuals
still never accumulate human capital, devoting all their non-leisure time to
work, i.e. we have, as in the previous case, h1t = h10 and u1t = 1 for any t.
However, now the dominant class does not work initially, devoting all their
non-leisure time to capital accumulation, that, until period T0 increases at
the maximal accumulation rate, B0. See (42). Therefore, in this case for
t < T0, specialization is more intense: the less talented agents just work,
while the others only accumulate capital. Nevertheless, once the share of hu-
man capital of the more talented class reaches the critical level 1− ρ (t) /B0,
i.e. when σ1T0 = σ
∗
1T0
, the dominant class starts working and, since less
time is devoted to capital accumulation, the rate of growth of human capital
decreases over time.
As the less talented agents never accumulate capital H1t = H10 for any t.
Then, we get immediately the following result.
Lemma 13 (shares of human capital). In case 1 of Proposition 12, the
shares of human capital at time t are given by
σ0t = 1 = σ1t for any t ≥ 0
σ1t =
σ10
σ10 + (1− σ10) eB0t
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T0 (52)
σ1t =
σ1T01
i=0wie
(B0−ρi)(t−T0)
for t > T0 (53)
where the denominator in (52) is an average with weights
wi ≡
πi
ρi
e(B0−ρi)T01
j=0
πj
ρj
e(B0−ρj)T0
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and
σ1T0 =
1
i=0
πi
B0
e(B0−ρi)T01
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B0−ρi)T0
We observe that (34) is a particular case of (53) with T0 = 0.
In case 2 of Proposition 12, since the starting value of the capital share
of the more talented class is below 1 − σ∗10, again the dominant class does
not work initially, only accumulating capital, which until period T2, where
σ0T2 reaches the critical value 1 − ρ (T2) /B0, increases at the maximal ac-
cumulation rate, B0. See (46). As in the previous case, after date T2 the
more talented agents start working and accumulate capital at a lower pace.
However, as, in this case, the more impatient agents are more skilled in accu-
mulating capital, they now accumulate capital until period T1, dividing their
non-leisure time between capital accumulation and work. Note however that
the time they devote to capital accumulation decreases continuously from
period 0 to T1, where u1T1 = 1. After period T1 they stop accumulating cap-
ital, devoting all their non-leisure time to work. As T1 ≤ T2 and until T2 the
other class is accumulating capital at the maximal rate, their capital share
declines steadily until period T1. The evolution in time of the capital shares
of both classes is given below in Lemma 14.
Lemma 14. In case 2 of Proposition 12, the shares of human capital at time
t are given by
σ0t = 1− σ1t for any t ≥ 0
σ1t =
σ10
σ10 + (1− σ10)
λ10h10e(B0−B1)t
λ10h10−
1
i=0
πi
ρi
(1−e−ρit)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T1
σ1t =
σ1T1
σ1T1 + (1− σ1T1) e
B0(t−T1)
for T1 ≤ t ≤ T2
σ1t =
σ1T21
i=0wie
(B0−ρi)(t−T2)
for t ≥ T2 (54)
where λ10h10 is given by (37) and the denominator in (54) is an average with
weights
wi ≡
πi
ρi
e(B0−ρi)T21
j=0
πj
ρj
e(B0−ρj)T2
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and
σ1T2 =
λ1T2h1T2e
B0T21
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B0−ρi)T2
4.2.3 Summarizing interpretation
In this section we considered two classes with diﬀerent skills, diﬀerent de-
grees of patience and diﬀerent initial capital stocks. We assumed, in line
with empirical plausibility, that the more talented class is also more patient.
We showed that in this case we never have an interior solution for working
time of both classes of agents. Moreover, several optimal solutions exist, de-
pending on the initial distribution of human capital and on the level of skills
of the less talented class. If the initial human capital share of the less skilled
individuals is not high enough, they will never accumulate human capital,
devoting all their non-leisure time to work. If their initial human capital
share is suﬃciently high two cases are possible. Either they are not suﬃ-
ciently skilled and again they only work, never accumulating human capital,
or they are suﬃciently skilled and devote initially some of their non-leisure
time to human capital accumulation. However, the time they devote to hu-
man capital accumulation decreases steadily in time, so that in the long run
we ﬁnd that, as before, the less talented agents never accumulate human
capital. In contrast, the more talented individuals always accumulate hu-
man capital. When their initial human capital share exceeds a critical value,
these individuals will also work every period. However, if their initial share
of human capital is not high enough, they will not work initially, devoting
all their non-leisure time to capital accumulation, that grows at the maximal
possible rate. This behavior continues until this critical level of their capital
share is reached. After, they will start working and accumulating capital as
in the previous solution. It is interesting to note two things. First, what
matters for the choice of the optimal solution is the distribution of human
capital and not its level.12 Second, in the long run, independently of the
initial conditions and of the level of skills, we always get the same result: less
talented individuals never accumulate capital and the more skilled agents
work and accumulate capital.
12Remark that the critical share of one class is always equal to one minus the critical
share of the other class.
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4.3 Inequality and growth in the redistribution case
Let us now discuss the trade-oﬀ between social inequalities and growth in the
redistribution case with heterogenous skills and discounting. From Lemmas
11, 13, and 14, we obtain immediately the dynamics of the Gini index of
wealth in this case.
Proposition 15 (human wealth inequality). If, without loss of general-
ity, h0t > h1t, the Gini index of human wealth is given by
ght = π1 − σ1t (55)
The dynamics of wealth inequality are the following.
When σ10 ≤ σ
∗
10:
ght = π1 −
σ101
i=0wie
(B0−ρi)t
for any t ≥ 0
When σ10 > σ
∗
10 and B1 ≤ B
∗
1:
ght = π1 −
σ10
σ10 + (1− σ10) eB0t
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T0
ght = π1 −
σ1T01
i=0wie
(B0−ρi)(t−T0)
for t > T0
When σ10 > σ
∗
10 and B1 > B
∗
1 :
ght = π1 −
σ10
σ10 + (1− σ10)
λ10h10e(B0−B1)t
λ10h10−
1
i=0
πi
ρi
(1−e−ρit)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T1
ght = π1 −
σ1T1
σ1T1 + (1− σ1T1) e
B0(t−T1)
for T1 ≤ t ≤ T2
ght = π1 −
σ1T21
i=0wie
(B0−ρi)(t−T2)
for t ≥ T2
In any case, the optimal Gini index of human wealth inequality increases
over time.
Proposition 16 (consumption inequality). The Gini index of consump-
tion is given by
gct = π1 −
π1c1t
π0c0t + π1c1t
= π1 −
π1
π1 + π0e(ρ1−ρ0)t
(56)
The Gini index of consumption increases over time from 0 to π1.
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The dynamics of the aggregate consumption growth rate are complicated
and depend on the regime considered. For simplicity, we focus on the more
plausible situation. i.e. the case considered in subsection 4.2.1, whose dy-
namics are given Proposition 10. In this case, σ10 ≤ σ
∗
10 meaning that the
more patient and talented class is relatively well endowed in human capital
at the beginning.
Proposition 17 (consumption growth rate). In the case of Proposition
10, the dynamics of aggregate consumption and its growth rate are given by
ct = AH10
ρ (0)
σ10
1
i=0
πi
B0
e(B0−ρi)t (57)
γct ≡
c˙t
ct
=
1
i=0 πi (B0 − ρi) e
(B0−ρi)t1
i=0 πie
(B0−ρi)t
(58)
Proposition 16 shows that, in the case of redistribution, the Gini index
of consumption converges to π1 or, equivalently, the consumption share of
the impatient class converges to 0. The same happens in the case of mer-
itocracy (Proposition 5). However, in the case of meritocracy, the growth
rate of consumption of the impatient class is B1 − ρ1, while, in the case of
redistribution considered in Proposition 17, it is equal to B0 − ρ1. Thus, in
this case of redistribution, the consumption of the impatient class grows at
a higher rate.
We can now obtain the trade-oﬀ between inequality and growth.
Proposition 18 (trade-oﬀ inequality-growth). The (aggregate) consump-
tion growth rate γc is a function of the Gini index of consumption gc. More
precisely, the growth rate is an average whose weights depend on the Gini
index:
γc (gc) =
1
i=0
(B0 − ρi)wi (gc) (59)
with
wi (gc) ≡
πi

π1
π0
π0+gc
π1−gc
B0−ρi
ρ1−ρ0
1
j=0 πj

π1
π0
π0+gc
π1−gc
B0−ρj
ρ1−ρ0
γc (gc) is an increasing function, increasing from γc (0) = B0− (π0ρ0 + π1ρ1)
to γc (π1) = B0− ρ0. Thus, the social inequality and the consumption growth
rate are positively correlated.
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This proposition means that higher inequality is associated with higher
growth, even in the case of redistribution. The planner raises the consump-
tion share of low discount rate agents and reduces that of higher discount rate
agents as time passes. This directly increases the inequality. On the other
hand, the consumption growth rate of low discount rate agents is higher than
that of high growth rate agents and, thus, the rise of the consumption share
of low discount rate agents raises the growth rate of aggregate consumption.
These results are consistent with empirical evidence. Many advanced
economies have experienced increasing (income) inequality since the 1980s,
see Atkinson (1999) and Goldin and Katz (2008). Moreover, according to
Turnovsky and Mitra (2013), this recent increase in inequality is explained
by the increasing role of human capital as an engine of growth.13
5 Discussion of the results and further com-
ments
Our ﬁrst important result is that heterogeneity matters. Without hetero-
geneity, redistribution is not an issue and, therefore, the two policy regimes
considered are indistinguishable. Also the eﬀect of heterogeneity is much
more pronounced in the case of redistribution. Indeed, in the meritocratic
case the optimal solution for each agent is identical to the Lucas (1988) rep-
resentative agent BGP, whereas with redistribution the optimal solution is
never the BGP. The type of heterogeneity also plays an important role.
Although we did not discuss it previously, it is easy to see that, if we only
had considered heterogeneity in the initial capital endowments, the optimal
solution would converge to the Lucas BGP, being identical in the long run
under both the meritocratic and redistributive regimes. When we introduce
also diﬀerent degrees of patience, the role of heterogeneity becomes more
important and the optimal solutions of the two regimes are no longer asymp-
totically identical. However, they are both interior in what concerns working
time. Finally, when we also consider heterogeneity in skills, in the redis-
tribution case, the optimal solution for non-leisure time devoted to capital
accumulation is never interior for both agents, being therefore dramatically
13Goldin and Katz (1999, 2001) and Abramovitz and David (2000) ﬁnd that the contri-
bution of human capital to growth almost doubled during the 20th century in the United
States, while the contribution of physical capital decreased.
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diﬀerent both from the meritocracy and from the representative agent so-
lutions. A second important, although trivial result is that social welfare
under the redistribution regime is always higher than under meritocracy.
Indeed, the ability to redistribute cannot reduce overall welfare since one op-
tion available to the planner is to choose to not redistribute. Since we have
seen that this is not the optimal path, the planner must do strictly better
redistributing.
Together, these two results imply that it is optimal to exploit existing
diﬀerences. We conjecture that, provided there is redistribution, welfare is
higher (within mean preserving transformations) when we move from the
representative agent case to an unequal distribution of skills. The proof is
left for further works.
It is also interesting to note that, in the redistribution regime, the dis-
tribution of consumption is not aﬀected by skills heterogeneity. Indeed only
diﬀerences in patience, i.e. in preferences, are taken into account by the plan-
ner when she allocates consumption to each agent. However, skills diﬀerences
are determinant for the allocation of tasks between agents. We found that, in
the long run, the less talented class never invests in human capital, regardless
of the initial distribution of human capital and of the eﬃciency of the less
skilled agents in accumulating human capital. Also, whenever the human
capital share of the more skilled class is below a certain critical threshold,
these agents do not supply labor, devoting all their non-leisure time to capi-
tal accumulation at the beginning. We conclude that selection in the access
to education and specialization are optimal.
We also ﬁnd that, in both regimes, the inequality in the distribution of
human capital increases in time. In the meritocratic regime, this is due to
diﬀerences in skills and in patience, which have therefore permanent eﬀects,
while with redistribution specialization is also an important driver of this re-
sult. Discussing now the relation between inequality and growth we ﬁnd that
in both regimes, in the long run, inequality is associated with higher rates
of growth. It is easy to see that, within our framework, human capital accu-
mulation is the channel through which inequality is associated with higher
growth. This happens, even with redistribution, suggesting that although re-
distribution increases utility and growth, it does not prevent a deterioration
in the distribution of consumption during the growth process.
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6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we extended the Lucas (1988) framework, introducing simulta-
neously heterogeneity in patience, in skills and in initial capital endowments.
We considered two policy regimes: "meritocracy" and "redistribution". Our
main conclusions are the following. First, heterogeneity changes signiﬁcantly
the optimal solution, specially in the presence of redistribution. Second,
cooperation is always better, i.e. utility under the redistribution regime is
always higher than under meritocracy. We conjecture that welfare is higher
(within mean preserving transformations) when we move from a represen-
tative agent economy to an economy with an unequal distribution of skills.
This means that it is optimal to exploit existing diﬀerences. Third, the re-
distribution of consumption only depends on preferences. In contrast, the
distribution of tasks takes into account skills diﬀerences. Finally, we ﬁnd
that inequality is associated with higher rates of growth.
These results are novel, showing that heterogeneity really matters, which
implies of course that the representative agent approach may be misleading.
Another point of our contribution we want to stress, is that heterogeneity,
instead of being considered a problem, should be optimally exploited in order
to increase welfare. However, for this outcome redistribution is essential. In
particular, we found that with redistribution, diﬀerences in skills should be
translated into specialization in tasks and in a diﬀerential access to education.
Note however that these results were obtained using a very stylized model.
Therefore they should not be seen as policy recommendations. Nevertheless,
in spite of the simplicity of the framework considered, the message that het-
erogeneity implies choices that are not only radically diﬀerent from the ones
associated with a representative agent economy, but which also dominate
them in terms of welfare, should still be true in more general settings. Fi-
nally, in this work we have only considered the ﬁrst best (planner’s solution).
Future work on the decentralized market solution is therefore welcome.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The Hamiltonian is written as follows:
1
i=0
πie
−ρit ln (Ahituit) +
1
i=0
λithitBi (1− uit)
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We have two state variables (hit) and two controls (uit).
We derive the ﬁrst-order conditions: ∂Ht/∂λit = h˙it, ∂Ht/∂hit = −λ˙it,
∂Ht/∂uit = 0 and the transversality condition limt→∞ (λithit) = 0. The
ﬁrst-order conditions write
u˙it = (Biuit − ρi)uit (60)
h˙it = Bi (1− uit) hit
jointly with the transversality condition limt→∞ (e
−ρit/uit) = 0.
Focus on the solution of ODE (60).
There are three cases.
(1) If ui0 < ρi/Bi,
uit =
1
Bi
ρi
1 + eρi(ci+t)
with
ci =
1
ρi
ln

ρi/Bi
ui0
− 1

(2) If ui0 = ρi/Bi,
uit =
ρi
Bi
(3) If ui0 > ρi/Bi,
uit =
1
Bi
ρi
1− eρi(ci+t)
≤ 1 for t ≤ t∗
uit = 1 for t > t
∗
with
ci =
1
ρi
ln
Biui0 − ρi
Bui0
< 0
t∗ ≡
1
ρi
ln

1−
ρi
Bi

− ci > 0
(1) Focus on the case ui0 < ρi/Bi.
We evaluate the utility along this trajectory: ∞
0
e−ρit ln (Ahituit) dt =
1
ρi

ln (Ahi0ui0) +
Bi
ρi
− 1
	
(2) Consider the second case: ui0 = ρi/Bi.
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The economy is at the steady state from the beginning.
We evaluate the utility at the steady state. ∞
0
e−ρit ln (Ahituit) dt =
1
ρi

ln (Ahi0ui0) +
Bi
ρi
− 1
	
Therefore, in the cases (1) and (2), we ﬁnd:
arg max
ui0≤ρi/Bi
 ∞
0
e−ρit ln (Ahituit) dt
= arg max
ui0≤ρi/Bi
1
ρi

ln (Ahi0ui0) +
Bi
ρi
− 1
	
=
ρi
Bi
and
max
ui0≤ρi/Bi
 ∞
0
e−ρit ln (Ahituit) dt =
1
ρi

ln

Ahi0
ρi
Bi

+
Bi
ρi
− 1
	
(3) Focus on the case ui0 > ρi/Bi.
The solution becomes
uit =
1
Bi
ρi
1− eρi(ci+t)
≤ 1 for t ≤ t∗
uit = 1 for t > t
∗
where
ci =
1
ρi
ln
Biui0 − ρi
Bui0
< 0
t∗ ≡
1
ρi
ln

1−
ρi
Bi

− ci > 0
We evaluate the utility along this trajectory. ∞
0
e−ρit ln (Ahituit) dt =
 t∗
0
e−ρit ln (Ahituit) dt+
 ∞
t∗
e−ρit ln (Ahit∗) dt
=
1
ρi

1− ui0
ui0
+ ln (Ahi0ui0)
	
Let us maximize ∞
0
e−ρit ln (Ahituit) dt =
1
ρi

1− ui0
ui0
+ ln (Ahi0ui0)
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with respect to ui0. Notice that
d
dui0

ln (Ahi0ui0) +
1− ui0
ui0
	
=
1
ui0
−
1
u2i0
< 0
for ui0 ∈ [ρi/Bi, 1). Then,
∞
0
e−ρit ln (Ahituit) dt decreases in [ρi/Bi, 1) and
attains its maximum at u∗i0 = ρi/Bi.
The value at u∗i0 = ρi/Bi is ∞
0
e−ρit ln (Ahituit) dt =
1
ρi

ln
Ahi0ρi
Bi
+
Bi
ρi
− 1

We conclude that u∗i0 = ρi/Bi maximizes the utility whatever the case we
consider. Since u∗i0 = ρi/Bi is also the steady state, we ﬁnd that the BGP
(9) is the planner’s solution.
Proof of Proposition 2. Under the assumption h0t > h1t, the Gini index of
wealth is given by:
ght =
π0h0t+π1h1t
2
−

π1π1h1t
2
+ π0π1h1t +
π0π0h0t
2

π0h0t+π1h1t
2
that is by (10).
Proof of Proposition 3. In order to compute the dynamics of the wealth Gini
index, we consider the optimal individual wealth dynamics (9): hit = hi0e
(Bi−ρi)t.
Under Assumption 4, B0 − ρ0 > B1 − ρ1. There are two cases: (1)
h00 > h10 and (2) h00 < h10.
(1) In the ﬁrst case, h0t > h1t for every t and, then,
ght = π1 −
π1h10e
(B1−ρ1)t
π0h00e(B0−ρ0)t + π1h10e(B1−ρ1)t
that is (11). It is easy to check that ght increases in time.
(2) In the second case, h00 < h10. Beyond the critical date Th, the
dominant consumer earns the higher revenue. Hence, Th is solution of h0T =
h1T , that is of h00e
(B0−ρ0)T = h10e
(B1−ρ1)T . We get (12).
Therefore, the Gini index of wealth is given by
ght = π0 −
π0h0t
π0h0t + π1h1t
for t ≤ Th
ght = π1 −
π1h1t
π0h0t + π1h1t
for t > Th
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Replacing the expressions hit = hi0e
(Bi−ρi)t, we obtain (13) and (14).
Proof of Proposition 5. Under the assumption c0t > c1t, the Gini index of
consumption is given by:
gct =
π0c0t+π1c1t
2
−

π1π1c1t
2
+ π0π1c1t +
π0π0c0t
2

π0c0t+π1c1t
2
that is by (15).
In order to compute the dynamics of the consumption Gini index, we con-
sider the individual income dynamics: cit = Ahituit = Ahi0ρie
(Bi−ρi)t/Bi =
ci0e
(Bi−ρi)t.
Under Assumption 4, B0−ρ0 > B1−ρ1. There are two cases: (1) c00 > c10
and (2) c00 < c10.
(1) In the ﬁrst case, c0t > c1t for every t and, then,
gct = π1 −
π1c10e
(B1−ρ1)t
π0c00e(B0−ρ0)t + π1c10e(B1−ρ1)t
that is (16). It is easy to check that gct increases in time.
(2) In the second case, c00 < c10. Beyond the critical date Tc, the domi-
nant consumer earns the higher revenue. Hence, Tc is solution of c0T = c1T ,
that is of c00e
(B0−ρ0)T = c10e
(B1−ρ1)T . We get (17).
Therefore, the Gini index is given by
gct = π0 −
π0c0t
π0c0t + π1c1t
for t ≤ Tc
gct = π1 −
π1c1t
π0c0t + π1c1t
for t > Tc
Replacing the expressions cit = ci0e
(Bi−ρi)t, we obtain (18) and (19).
Proof of Proposition 6. The aggregate consumption growth rate is given by
γt ≡
c˙t
ct
=
1
i=0 πici0e
(Bi−ρi)t
′1
i=0 πici0e
(Bi−ρi)t
=
1
i=0 πici0 (Bi − ρi) e
(Bi−ρi)t1
i=0 πici0e
(Bi−ρi)t
that is by (20).
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Proof of Proposition 7. Focus on case (1): c00 > c10. From (16), we ﬁnd
e−δt =
π0c00
π1c10
π1 − gt
π0 + gt
Replacing this in (20), we obtain the trade-oﬀ (21) between inequality
and growth.
Focus on case (2): c00 < c10. In the case t ≤ T , we have
e−δt =
π0c00
π1c10
π1 + gt
π0 − gt
Replacing this in (20), we ﬁnd the trade-oﬀ between the inequality and
growth (22). Similarly, we obtain (23).
Proof of Proposition 8. In this case B0 = B1 = B, and 0 < ρ0 < ρ1. By sup-
posing that we have interior solution, the Hamiltonian is written as follows:
Ht =

1
i=0
πie
−ρit

ln
1
i=0
πihituit +B
1
i=0
λit (1− uit) hit
Since hit maximizes Ht, ∂Ht/∂uit = 0, which implies:
Bλit = πi
1
j=0 πje
−ρjt1
j=0 πjhjtujt
(61)
Replacing (61) in ∂Ht/∂hit = −λ˙it, we ﬁnd
−λ˙it = λitBuit + λitB (1− uit) = Bλit
Which implies λit = λi0e
−Bt. We have also for any t,
λ0t
λ1t
=
Bλ0t
Bλ1t
=
π0
π1
Deﬁne
φ =
π0
λ00
=
π1
λ10
From (61), we get
1
i=0
πihituit =
φ
B
1
i=0
πie
(B−ρi)t
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Deﬁne Ht ≡
1
i=0Hit =
1
i=0 πihit. We have
H˙t =
1
i=0
πth˙it =
1
i=0
πiBhit (1− uit) = BHt − φ
1
i=0
πie
(B−ρi)t
Deﬁne
zt = Ht − φ
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B−ρi)t
We get
z˙t = H˙t − φ
1
i=0
πi
ρi
(B − ρi)e
(B−ρi)t
= BHt − φ
1
i=0
πte
(B−ρi)t − φ
1
i=0
πi
ρi
(B − ρi)e
(B−ρi)t
= Bzt
This implies zt = z0e
Bt and
Ht = z0e
Bt + φ
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B−ρi)t
From the tranversality condition, we have
lim
t→∞
(λithit) =
λi0
πi
lim
t→∞

e−Btπihit

= 0
Then, limt→∞

e−Btπihit

= 0 and
0 = lim
t→∞

e−Bt
1
i=0
πihit

= lim
t→∞

e−BtHt

= lim
t→∞

z0 + φ
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e−ρit

= z0
which implies zt = 0 for any t. Thus,
1
i=0
πihit = Ht = φ
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B−ρi)t (62)
We can guess that the solution must satisﬁes, for i = 0, 1, equation (26)
where ζ0 and ζ1 satisfy
1
i=0 πiζ i = 1. We observe that ζi in (27) satisﬁes
this condition.
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We can also guess that
hituit =
φ
B
ζi
1
j=0
πje
(B−ρj)t (63)
We observe that (63) satisﬁes (26).
This is equivalent to
uit =
φ
B
ζi
1
j=0 πje
(B−ρj)t
φζi
1
j=0
πj
ρj
e(B−ρj)t
that is (26).
We can now construct the solution. Considering (62) with t = 0, we get
φ in (26).
Considering (63) with t = 0, we get
ζi =
hi0
φ
1
i=0 πj/ρj
that is ζi in (26). We observe that
1
i=0 πiζi = 1.
Deﬁne λi0 = πi/φ yielding λit = e
−Btπi/φ.
Observe that 0 < uit < 1 and h˙it = Bhit −Bhituit = Bhit(1− uit).
We can verify easily that (hit, uit, λit) satisﬁes Pontryagin’s conditions.
Observe that in this case (B0 = B1 = B), we have u0t = u1t = ut, which
converges to ρ0/B. The total human capital stock Ht =
1
i=0 πihit, satisﬁes
H˙t = BHt(1− ut).
Proof of Proposition 9. Suppose the contrary: there exists t such that, for
every i, 0 < uit < 1. This implies the existence of t1 < t2 such that 0 < uit <
1 for every t1 < t < t2. On the interval (t1, t2) the Hamiltonian is written as
follows:
Ht =

1
i=0
πie
−ρit

ln
1
i=0
πihituit +
1
i=0
λitBi (1− uit)hit
For every t1 < t < t2, we have ∂Ht/∂uit = 0, ∂Ht/∂λit = h˙it and
∂Ht/∂hit = −λ˙it. The ﬁrst equation implies that, for every i:
Biλit = πi
1
j=0 πje
−ρjt1
j=0 πjhjtujt
(64)
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Replacing (64) in ∂Ht/∂hit = −λ˙it, we ﬁnd
−λ˙it = λitBiuit + λitBi (1− uit) = λitBi
Integrating from t1 to t, we obtain λit = λit1e
−Bi(t−t1) for any t1 < t <
t2. From (64), we have also B0λ0t/ (B1λ1t) = π0/π1. This implies that
e−(B0−B1)(t−t1) = π0B1λ1t1/ (π1B0λ0t1) for any t1 < t < t2. This leads to a
contradiction with B0 = B1 since, in this case, the left-hand side changes
over time.
Proof of Proposition 10. The Hamiltonian is written as follows:
Ht =

1
i=0
πie
−ρit

ln
1
i=0
πihituit +
1
i=0
λitBi (1− uit)hit
Proposition 9 allows us to focus on a candidate solution which is a corner
solution for one agent: there exists T ≥ 0 such that
0 < u0t < 1 and u1t = 1 (65)
for every t ≥ T . We will show that T = 0 and the Pontryagin’s optimal
conditions are satisﬁed.
If (65) is solution, we have
∂Ht
∂u0t

0<u0t<1
= π0h0t
1
i=0 πie
−ρit1
i=0 πihituit
−B0λ0th0t = 0 (66)
∂Ht
∂u1t

u1t=1
= π1h1t
1
i=0 πie
−ρit1
i=0 πihituit
−B1λ1th1t ≥ 0 (67)
Therefore,
B0λ0t = π0
1
i=0 πie
−ρit1
i=0 πihituit
(68)
0 < u0t < 1 implies
λ˙0t = −
∂Ht
∂h0t
= −π0u0t
1
i=0 πie
−ρit1
i=0 πihituit
−B0λ0t (1− u0t) = −B0λ0t (69)
(69) entails
λ0t = λ0Te
−B0(t−T ) (70)
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for any t ≥ T .
u1t = 1 implies
λ˙1t = −
∂Ht
∂h1t
= −π1u1t
1
i=0 πie
−ρit1
i=0 πihituit
−B1λ1t (1− u1t) = −
π1
π0
B0λ0t
Moreover,
λ˙1t = −
π1
π0
B0λ0t =
π1
π0
λ˙0t
that is
λ1t =
π1
π0
(λ0t − λ0T ) + λ1T =
π1
π0
λ0Te
−B0(t−T ) + λ1T −
π1
π0
λ0T (71)
A candidate solution satisﬁes the transversality condition, that is
lim
t→∞
(λ1th1t) = lim
t→∞

π1
π0
λ0Te
−B0(t−T )h1t
	
+ lim
t→∞

λ1T −
π1
π0
λ0T

h1t
	
= 0
which holds only if λ1T − λ0Tπ1/π0 = 0. According to (71), we ﬁnd
λ1t =
π1
π0
λ0t
Replacing (70) in equation (68), we get
1
i=0
πihituit =
π0
B0λ0TeB0T
1
i=0
πie
(B0−ρi)t
and, noticing that u1t = 1 and h1t = h1T for every t ≥ T , we obtain
h0tu0t =
1
B0λ0TeB0T
1
i=0
πie
(B0−ρi)t −
π1
π0
h1T (72)
Therefore,
h˙0t = B0h0t −B0u0th0t = B0h0t +B0
π1
π0
h1T −
1
i=0 πie
(B0−ρi)t
λ0TeB0T
This diﬀerential equation is equivalent to z˙t = B0zt, where
zt ≡ h0t +
π1
π0
h1T −
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B0−ρi)t
λ0TeB0T
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The solution of z˙t = B0zt is zt = zTe
B0(t−T ) for t ≥ T . Thus
h0t = zTe
B0(t−T ) −
π1
π0
h1T +
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B0−ρi)t
λ0TeB0T
(73)
A candidate solution satisﬁes the transversality condition, that is, accord-
ing to (70),
lim
t→∞
(λ0th0t) = lim
t→∞
(λ0TzT ) + lim
t→∞

λ0t
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B0−ρi)t
λ0TeB0T
−
π1
π0
h1T

= 0
which holds only if zT = 0, that is only if
π1h1T + π0h0T = π0
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B0−ρi)T
λ0TeB0T
=
π0
λ0T
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e−ρiT (74)
(68) and (74) imply
B0
ρ (T )
=
π0h0T + π1h1T
π1h1T + π0h0Tu0T
(75)
where ρ (T ) is given by (28).
We compute u0T from (75) and we impose the economic restriction 0 ≤
u0T ≤ 1 or, equivalently,
1 ≤
B0
ρ (T )
≤
1
σ1T
(76)
(0 ≤ u0T is equivalent to the RHS, while u0T ≤ 1 to the LHS).
Inequality in the LHS of (76) is satisﬁed by Assumption 5: B0 > ρ1 >
ρ (T ).
Thus, the candidate solution holds for every t ≥ 0 only if the RHS holds
at T = 0. It is the case because (76) with T = 0 is equivalent to the initial
condition σ10 ≤ σ
∗
10.
Let us now provide the explicit trajectory for hit and uit and show that
the optimal conditions are veriﬁed.
From (75) with T = 0, we have
u00 =
ρ (0)
B0
−

1−
ρ (0)
B0
	
H10
H00
38
As seen above, 0 ≤ u00 ≤ 1 under Assumption 5 and inequality σ10 ≤
ρ (0) /B0.
From (68) and (74) with T = 0, we ﬁnd λ00.
Moreover, (73) with zT = 0 and T = 0 implies
h0t =
1
λ00
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B0−ρi)t −
π1
π0
h10 (77)
Replacing (77) in (72) with T = 0 and solving for u0t, we get (31).
Let us show that
λ0t =
π0e
−B0t
H00 +H10
1
i=0
πi
ρi
(78)
λ1t =
π1
π0
λ0t (79)
and (32) to (31) satisfy the Maximum Principle by Pontryagin.
First, replacing (78), (30) and (31) in (66), we ﬁnd
∂Ht
∂u0t

0<u0t<1
= 0
Assumption 5 (B0 > B1) implies
B1λ1t < B0λ1t = B0λ0t
π1
π0
=
π1
1
i=0 πie
−ρit
π0h0tu0t + π1h10
and, so, according to (67), also
∂Ht
∂u1t

u1t=1
≥ 0
Moreover,
λ˙0t = −λ0tB0 = −
∂Ht
∂h0t
λ˙1t = −
π1

i πie
−ρit
π1h10 + π0h0tu0t
= −
π1
π0
λ0tB0 = −
∂Ht
∂h1t
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Finally, we check the transversality conditions. Since
lim
t→∞
(λithit) = lim
t→∞

λi0e
−Bithit

= λi0 lim
t→∞

e−Bithit

= λi0 lim
t→∞


e−Bithi0e
 t
0 Bi(1−uis)ds

= λi0e
−Bi

∞
0 uisds
the transversality conditions are equivalent to
∞
0
uisds = ∞. These equal-
ities are satisﬁed because limt→∞ u0t = ρ0/B0 > 0 and u1t = 1 for every t.
Proof of Proposition 12. (1) Focus ﬁrst on the case B1 ≤ B
∗
1 .
Proposition 9 allows us to focus on a candidate solution which is a corner
solution for one agent. We prove the ﬁrst subcase by considering a potential
solution such that
u0t = 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T
0 < u0t < 1 for t > T (80)
u1t = 1 for any t
by deriving its explicit trajectory and checking that this trajectory satisﬁes
the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle.
According to the Maximum Principle, we need
∂Ht
∂u0t

u0t=0
= π0h0t
1
i=0 πie
−ρit1
i=0 πihituit
−B0λ0th0t ≤ 0 (81)
∂Ht
∂u1t

u1t=1
= π1h1t
1
i=0 πie
−ρit1
i=0 πihituit
−B1λ1th1t ≥ 0 (82)
for any t ∈ [0, T ], that is
B0λ0t ≥
π0
π1
1
i=0 πie
−ρit
h10
and B1λ1t ≤
1
i=0 πie
−ρit
h10
Moreover, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
λ˙0t = −
∂Ht
∂h0t
= −π0u0t
1
i=0 πie
−ρit1
i=0 πihituit
−B0λ0t (1− u0t)
λ˙1t = −
∂Ht
∂h1t
= −π1u1t
1
i=0 πie
−ρit1
i=0 πihituit
−B1λ1t (1− u1t)
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that is
λ˙0t = −B0λ0t and λ˙1t = −
1
i=0 πie
−ρit
h10
with solutions
λ0t = λ00e
−B0t and λ1t = λ10 −
1
h10
1
i=0
πi
ρi

1− e−tρi

If t > T , according to the Maximum Principle, we require
∂Ht
∂u0t

0<u0t<1
= π0h0t
1
i=0 πie
−ρit1
i=0 πihituit
−B0λ0th0t = 0
that is
B0λ0t = π0
1
i=0 πie
−ρit1
i=0 πihituit
(83)
which implies in turn
λ˙0t = −u0t

π0
1
i=0 πie
−ρit1
i=0 πihituit

−B0λ0t (1− u0t) = −B0λ0t
with explicit solution λ0t = λ00e
−B1t. Thus, this trajectory holds for every t.
If 0 ≤ t ≤ T , we obtain h˙0t = B0h0t from h˙0t = B0 (1− u0t) h0t, that is
h0t = h00e
B0t.
If t ≥ T , (83) and u1t = 1 entail
λ˙1t = −π1u1t
1
i=0 πie
−ρit1
i=0 πihituit
−B1λ1t (1− u1t) = −
π1
π0
B0λ0t =
π1
π0
λ˙0t
and
λ1t =
π1
π0
(λ0t − λ0T ) + λ1T =
π1
π0
λ0Te
−B0(t−T ) + λ1T −
π1
π0
λ0T (84)
According to the Maximum Principle, a candidate trajectory satisﬁes also
the transversality condition:
lim
t→∞
(λ1th1t) = lim
t→∞

π1
π0
λ0Te
−B0(t−T )h1t
	
+ lim
t→∞

λ1T −
π1
π2
λ2T

h1t
	
= 0
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which holds only if λ1T − λ0Tπ1/π0 = 0. Therefore, (84) implies λ1t =
λ0tπ1/π0, for any t ≥ T . In particular, we get λ1T = λ0Tπ1/π0. Replacing
λ0t = λ00e
−B0t in equation (83), we get
1
i=0
πihituit =
π0
1
i=0 πie
−ρit
B0λ00e−B0t
=
π0
1
i=0 πie
(B0−ρi)t
B0λ0TeB0T
and, noticing that u1t = 1 and h1t = h1T for every t ≥ T , we obtain
h0tu0t =
1
i=0 πie
(B0−ρi)t
B0λ0TeB0T
−
π1
π0
h1T
Therefore, for t ≥ T ,
h˙0t = B0h0t −B0h0tu0t = B0h0t +B0
π1
π0
h1T −
1
i=0 πie
(B0−ρi)t
λ0TeB0T
or, equivalently, z˙t = B0zt with
zt ≡ h0t +
π1
π0
h1T −
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B0−ρi)t
λ0TeB0T
whose solution is zt = zTe
B0(t−T ). Thus,
h0t = zTe
B0(t−T ) −
π1
π0
h1T +
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B0−ρi)t
λ0TeB0T
for t ≥ T .
As above, a candidate solution satisﬁes also the transversality condition:
lim
t→∞
(λ0th0t) = lim
t→∞
(λ0TzT ) + lim
t→∞

λ0t
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B0−ρi)t
λ0TeB0T
−
π1
π0
h1T

= 0
which holds only if zT = 0 or, equivalently,
π1h1T + π0h0T = π0
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B0−ρi)T
λ0TeB0T
=
π0
λ0T
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e−ρiT (85)
(83) and (85) imply
B0
ρ (T )
=
π0h0T + π1h1T
π0h0Tu0T + π1h1T
(86)
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Since u0T = 0, h1T = h10, h0T = h00e
B0T and Hi0 ≡ πihi0, (86) is equivalent
to (35).
The critical time T of the candidate trajectory (80) is precisely the so-
lution T0 of equation (35). This solution exists and is positive. Indeed, we
know that ρ (T ) ∈ [ρ0, ρ (0)], a bounded interval. Moreover, (35) is equiv-
alent to eB0TH00/H10 = B0/ρ (T ) − 1, whose RHS is positive according to
Assumption 5 (B0 > ρ1 > ρ (T )) and bounded from above. The LHS goes
from H00/H10 to ∞. If H00/H10 < B0/max ρ (T ) − 1 = B0/ρ (0) − 1, then
a solution T0 exists. But this inequality is precisely equivalent to inequality
σ10 > σ
∗
10, precisely the case we are considering in Proposition 12.
From (85), we get
λ0T0 =
π0
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e−ρiT0
H00eB0T0 +H10
and, from (35),
λ0T0 =
π0
1
i=0 πie
−ρiT0
B0H10
(87)
We want to prove that the trajectory deﬁned by equations
λ0t = λ0T0e
B0(T0−t) for any t (88)
λ1t =
π1
π0
λ0T0 +
1
h10
1
i=0
πi
ρi

e−ρit − e−ρiT0

for 0 ≤ t ≤ T0 (89)
λ1t =
π1
π0
λ0T0e
B0(T0−t) for t > T0 (90)
and (44) to (43) satisﬁes the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle.
It is easy to check that λ0t and λ1t are diﬀerentiable functions with respect
to t in [0,+∞) with λ˙it = −∂Ht/∂hit and that, for any t, we have h˙0t =
B0 (1− u0t)h0t.
Let us show that u0t and u1t maximize the Hamiltonian. For t > T0,
apply the proof of Proposition 10. Focus now on 0 ≤ t ≤ T0.
We want to prove that ∂Ht/∂u0t|u0t=0 ≤ 0.
Since
1
i=0 πie
(B0−ρi)t is strictly increasing and
B0
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B0−ρi)T0
1 + eB0T0H00/H10
=
1
i=0
πie
(B0−ρi)T0
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then, for any t ∈ [0, T0], we have
B0
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B0−ρi)T0
1 + eB0T0H00/H10
≥
1
i=0
πie
(B0−ρi)T0
or, equivalently,
B0λ0t = B0λ0T0e
B0(T0−t) ≥ π0
1
i=0 πie
−ρit1
i=0 πihituit
because u0t = 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T0 and u1t = 1 for any t. Then, (81) is veriﬁed.
This means that u0t = 0 maximizes the Hamiltonian.
We want to prove that ∂Ht/∂u1t|u1t=1 ≥ 0.
(39) is equivalent to
1
i=0

1
ρi
−
1
B1

πie
−ρi0 ≤
1
i=0

1
ρi
−
1
B0

πie
−ρiT0
which implies
1
i=0

1
ρi
−
1
B1

πie
−ρit ≤
1
i=0

1
ρi
−
1
B0

πie
−ρiT0 (91)
for any t ∈ [0, T0], because the LHS of (91), under Assumption 5, is a de-
creasing function of t. By deﬁnition of T0,
1
i=0

1
ρi
−
1
B0

πie
−ρiT0 =
1
B0
H00
H10
1
i=0
πie
(B0−ρi)T0
Inequality (91) becomes
1
i=0

1
ρi
−
1
B1

πie
−ρit ≤
1
B0
H00
H10
1
i=0
πie
(B0−ρi)T0 =
1
i=0

1
ρi
−
1
B0

πie
−ρiT0
(92)
for any t ∈ [0, T0]. (89) and (87) imply
1
i=0

1
ρi
−
1
B0

πie
−ρiT0 =
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e−ρit − λ1th10
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Therefore, (92) becomes
B1λ1t ≤
1
i=0 πie
−ρit
h10
= π1
1
i=0 πie
−ρit1
i=0 πihituit
(because u0t = 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T0 and u1t = 1 for any t), that is, accord-
ing to (82), ∂Ht/∂u1t|u1t=1 ≥ 0. This means that u1t = 1 maximizes the
Hamiltonian.
(2) Focus now on the case B1 > B
∗
1 .
Proposition 9 allows us to focus on a candidate solution which is cor-
ner solution for one agent. We prove the second subcase by considering a
potential solution such that
u0t = 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T2
0 < u0t < 1 for t > T2
0 < u1t < 1 for 0 ≤ t < T1
u1t = 1 for t ≥ T1
with T1 < T2, by deriving its explicit trajectory and checking that this tra-
jectory satisﬁes the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle.
Applying the arguments of point (2.1) to determine T0 (namely, the
transversality condition), we ﬁnd T2 as solution of
B0
ρ (T2)
= 1 +
H0T2
H1T2
= 1 +
H00
H10
eB0T2
eB1T1


1 + 1
λ10h10
1
i=0
πi
ρi
(e−ρiT1 − 1)

that is of (36).
For 0 ≤ t ≤ T1 we have
∂Ht
∂u1t

0<u1t<1
= π1h1t
1
i=0 πie
−ρit1
i=0 πihituit
−B1λ1th1t = 0
that is
B1λ1t =
1
i=0 πie
−ρit
h1tu1t
(93)
since u0t = 0 and 0 < u1t < 1 (because T1 < T2).
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Moreover, using (93), we ﬁnd
λ˙1t = −
∂Ht
∂h1t
= −π1u1t
1
i=0 πie
−ρit1
i=0 πihituit
−B1λ1t (1− u1t) = −B1λ1t
Therefore, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T1, λ1t = λ10e
−B1t and, from (93),
h1tu1t =
1
i=0 πie
−ρit
B1λ1t
=
1
B1λ10
1
i=0
πie
(B1−ρi)t (94)
The law of motion h˙1t = B1 (1− u1t)h1t and (94) imply
h˙1t = B1h1t −
1
λ10
1
i=0
πie
(B1−ρi)t (95)
We deﬁne
zt ≡ h1t −
1
λ10
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B1−ρi)t (96)
Using (95), it is easy to verify that z˙t = B1zt. Thus, zt = z1e
B1t. From
(96), we obtain
h1t = z1e
B1t +
1
λ10
1
i=0
πi
ρi
e(B1−ρi)t with z1 = h10 −
1
λ10
1
i=0
πi
ρi
(97)
(95) and (97) imply h˙1t = e
B1tφ (t) where
φ (t) ≡ B1h10 −
1
λ10
1
i=0
πi

B1
ρi
+

1−
B1
ρi

e−ρit
	
Assume that
1
B1h10
< λ10 <
1
h10
1
i=0
πi
ρi
Therefore,
φ (0) = B1h10 −
1
λ10
> 0 > B1h10 −
B1
λ10
1
i=0
πi
ρi
= φ (∞)
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Thus, φ (t) = 0 (that is h˙1t = 0) has solution. Let T1 > 0 be the smallest
solution. This solution depends on λ10. φ (T1) = 0 is equivalent to (37).
Function T1 (λ10) behaves as follows.
λ10 →
1
B1h10
⇔ T1 (λ10)→ 0
λ10 →
1
h10
1
i=0
πi
ρi
⇔ T1 (λ10)→∞
There exists a constant C such that h1t < Ce
B1t for any t ≥ 0. Hence for
T1 big enough we have
h0T1
h1T1
>
eB0T1
CeB1T1
=
e(B0−B1)T1
C
>
π1
π0

B0
ρ (T1)
− 1
	
or, equivalently, B0/ρ (T1) < 1 +H0T1/H1T1. Since B0/ρ (0) > 1 +H00/H10,
there exists λˆ such that for T1 = T1

λˆ

:
B0
ρ (T1)
= 1 +
H0T1
H1T1
We observe that T1 (λ10) < T2 (λ10) for 1/ (B1h10) < λ10 < λˆ. Diﬀerenti-
ating φ (t) = 0 with respect to t and λ10, we ﬁnd at t = T2:
T ′1 (λ10) =
B1h10/
1
j=0 πje
−ρjT1
B1 −
1
i=0 ρi
πie−ρiT11
j=0 πje
−ρjT1
> 0
Moreover, T1(λˆ) = T2(λˆ).
Therefore,
λ˙1t = −
∂Ht
∂h1t
= −π1u1t
1
i=0 πie
−ρit1
i=0 πihituit
−B1λ1t (1− u1t) = −
1
i=0 πie
−ρit
h1T1
(98)
At t = T1, we have ∂Ht/∂u1t = 0, that is
λ1T1 =
1
i=0 πie
−ρiT1
B1h1T1
(99)
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Integrating (98) from T1 to t ≤ T2, we get
λ1t = λ1T1 +
1
h1T1
1
i=0
πi
ρi

e−ρit − e−ρiT1

Replacing (99), we obtain
λ1t =
1
h1T1
1
i=0
πi
ρi

e−ρit +

ρi
B1
− 1

e−ρiT1
	
for T1 ≤ t ≤ T2 (100)
and, in particular, (51).
At time T2, the optimal solution satisﬁes ∂Ht/∂u0t = 0 or, equivalently,
B0λ0t = π0
1
i=0 πie
−ρit1
i=0 πihituit
(101)
that is
λ0T2 =
π0
B0H1T1
1
i=0
πie
−ρiT2 (102)
Using (101), we ﬁnd
λ˙1t = −
∂Ht
∂h1t
= −π1u1t
1
i=0 πie
−ρit1
i=0 πihituit
−B1λ1t (1− u1t) = −
π1
π0
B0λ0t =
π1
π0
λ˙0t
Integrating (98) from T1 to t ≤ T2, we get
λ1t =
π1
π0
(λ0t − λ0T1) + λ1T1 =
π1
π0
λ0T1e
−B0(t−T1) + λ1T1 −
π1
π0
λ0T1
A candidate solution satisﬁes the transversality condition, that is
lim
t→∞
(λ1th1t) = lim
t→∞

π1
π0
λ0T1e
−B0(t−T1)h1t
	
+ lim
t→∞

λ1T1 −
π1
π0
λ0T1

h1t
	
= 0
which holds only if λ1T1 − λ0T1π1/π0 = 0. This implies λ1t = λ0tπ1/π0. In
particular, at the point T2 > T1, we have λ1T2 = λ0T2π1/π0 and, according to
(102),
λ1T2 =
π1
π0
λ0T2 =
1
B0h1T1
1
i=0
πie
−ρiT2
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Using (51), we obtain (38). To conclude, we must prove that there exists
λ10 with
1
h10
1
i=0
πi
ρi
< λ10 < λˆ
such that the equation (38) is veriﬁed. Indeed, for
λ10 =
1
h10
1
i=0
πi
ρi
we have T1 (λ10) = 0 and T2 (λ10) = T0 and, so,
f (λ10) ≡
1
ρ(T0)
− 1
B0
1
ρ(0)
− 1
B1
−
11
i=0 πie
−ρiT0
< 0
because of (??). For λ = λˆ, we have T1 (λ10) = T2 (λ10) and, so,
f (λ10) ≡
1
ρ(T1(λ10))
− 1
B0
1
ρ(T1(λ10))
− 1
B1
− 1 > 0
since B0 > B1. f is a continuous function. Then, there exists λ10 such that
f (λ10) = 0, that is (38) is satisﬁed.
Finally, we can construct the explicit solution with λ10 solution of (38).
We have λ0t = λ00e
−B0t for any t with λ00 = λ1T2e
B0T2π0/π1. Moreover,
h0t = h00e
B0t for 0 ≤ t ≤ T2, while for t ≥ T2, we obtain (47) similarly to
(41). We have also u0t = 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T2, while, for t ≥ T2, we obtain (48)
similarly to (43).
For 0 ≤ t ≤ T1, from (94) and (97), we obtain (50). We observe that
h1t = h1T1 for t ≥ T1.
For 0 ≤ t ≤ T1, it is easy to see that λ1t = λ10e
−B0t, while, for T1 ≤ t ≤ T2,
λ1t is given by (100). For t ≥ T2, we ﬁnd λ1t = λ1T2e
−B0(t−T2).
Proof of Proposition 15. Under the assumption h0 > h1, the Gini index of
wealth is given by:
ght =
π0h0t+π1h1t
2
−

π1π1h1t
2
+ π0π1h1t +
π0π0h0t
2

π0h0t+π1h1t
2
49
that is by
ght = π1 −
π1h1t
π0h0t + π1h1t
= π1 −
H1t
H0t +H1t
or, equivalently, by (55).
Proof of Proposition 16. According to (25), ρ0 < ρ1 implies c0t > c1t. Thus,
the Gini index of consumption is given by
gct = π1 −
π1c1t
π0c0t + π1c1t
(103)
Replacing (25) in (103) we get (56).
Proof of Proposition 17. Focus on Proposition 10. According to (25), we
obtain the aggregate consumption:
ct =
1
i=0
πiAe
−ρit
1
j=0 πjhjtujt1
j=0 πje
−ρjt
= A (π0h0tu0t + π1h1tu1t)
and, so, replacing expressions (30) to (33), we ﬁnd (57). Computing the time
derivative of (57), we obtain the aggregate consumption growth rate (58).
Proof of Proposition 18. From equation (56), we ﬁnd
e(B0−ρi)t =

π1
π0
π0 + gct
π1 − gct
B0−ρi
ρ1−ρ0
(104)
Replacing (104) in (58) we ﬁnd (59). Finally, it is easy to show that γc is an
increasing function of gc.
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